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Abstract
This thesis used Dr. Leveson's STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process) model
of accident causation to analyze a friendly fire accident that occurred on 22 March 03 between a
British Tornado aircraft and a US Patriot Missile battery. This causation model analyzes system
constraints, control loops, and process models to identify inadequate control structures leading to
hazards and preventative measures that may be taken to reduce the effect of these hazards. By
using a system-based causation model like STAMP, rather than a traditional chain of events
model, this thesis aimed to identify systemic factors and component interactions that may have
contributed to the accident, rather than simply analyzing component failures. Additionally, care
was taken to understand the rationale for decisions that were made, rather than assigning blame.
The analysis identified a number of areas in which control flaws or inadequacies led to the
friendly fire incident. A set of recommendations was developed that may help to prevent similar
accidents from occurring in the future.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
On 22 Mar 03 a British Tornado aircraft was incorrectly identified as an Anti-Radiation Missile
(ARM) and engaged by a nearby Patriot missile battery. Both crewmembers were killed in the
accident. A subsequent investigation by the British Ministry of Defence cited a number of
contributory factors that led to this incident, including a presumed fault in the Identification
Friend or Foe (IFF) system aboard the aircraft.
This thesis aims to examine this incident from a more holistic system-based approach in order to
identify any systemic factors or component interactions that may have played a role in this
incident. By using a system-based approach to safety analysis, the emergent properties of this
complex socio-technical system can be examined. By examining the accident from a systems
perspective, more focus can be placed on component interactions, rather than component
failures. Additionally, this type of analysis can help to determine why each action in the system
was taken, rather than simply detailing what happened.
This thesis begins in Chapter 2 with an examination of the motivation behind system-based
causation models. Then, the accident description and proximal event chain are described in
Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 provide an overview of the investigations performed by the Ministry
of Defence and a Defense Science Board Task Force, respectively. Chapter 6 provides a full
accident analysis using the system-based causality model (CAST), including a description of the
safety control structure, an examination of the control flaws or inadequacies at each level of the
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structure, and a set of recommendations drawn from these inadequacies. The thesis concludes
with Chapter 7, which recommends a path forward based on the results of the CAST analysis.
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Chapter 2. Motivation for System-based Causation Models
This section will examine the differences between two fundamental sets of causation models:
Event Chain-based models and System-based models. A brief overview of the limitations of
Event Chain models is given and a new approach is discussed that eliminates many of these
limitations.
Event Chain Models
In most traditional safety models, accidents are presented as the result of a linear chain of failure
events, where each failure is the direct cause of the next event in the chain [2]. In these models,
accidents are explained as a sequence of events that occur over time and almost always involve
component failure, human error, or energy-related events (e.g. explosions or fires) [4].
The Trouble with Event Chain Causality Models
Dr. Leveson presents several reasons why these traditional chain of event models are no longer
adequate for complex socio-technical systems [3]:
1. Confusion of reliability with safety - Traditional accident models often assume that if a
system is reliable, then it is safe. However, in more modem complex systems accidents
can occur even if no individual component has failed. Instead, serious accidents can
occur because of unsafe interactions between system components.
2. Event Chain-based Causation - Traditional accident models assume that system behavior
can be explained as a series of linearly related events over time. However, in complex
Scott McCarthy
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systems indirect events, inadequate system controls, and organizational factors can play a
prominent role in understanding accidents.
3. Limitations of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) - There is typically a strong desire
to quantify the probability of risk in a system, such that the system can be analyzed and
decisions be made based on the result of risk assessment calculations. Many risk
assessment tools, such as Fault Tree Analysis are based on such quantifications. One of
the major failures of PRA in complex systems is in treating initiating events as mutually
exclusive and independent. In reality, the initiating events of an accident are often the
result of a migration to a higher state of risk over time due to systemic factors.
4. Role of Operators in Accidents - Most event chain-based accident analyses stop when
they find an operator to blame for the accident, often blaming the operator for not
following a documented process or procedure. These models often stop here because it is
difficult to find an event that led the operator to make a particular decision. The reality is
that the decision may have been influenced by the design of the system or by the
organizational safety culture.
5. Role of Software in Accidents - Most complex systems built today have a large software
component. Traditional causation models view software as just another system
component and only attempt to apply reliability and correctness techniques. The reality is
that software allows us to build more flexible and complicated systems than we ever have
before and software cannot be isolated as an independent system component; it must be
viewed in terms of its interactions with other parts of the system.
6. Static vs. Dynamic View of Systems - Traditional accident models often treat accidents
as a simultaneous occurrence of random events. These models fail to recognize that
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systems are dynamic and that over time they migrate toward a higher state of risk,
making an accident more likely.
These limitations of traditional causation models and their underlying assumptions led Dr.
Leveson to rewrite the assumptions and determine what would be needed to develop a new
accident causation model based on systems theory [3]:
Old Assumption New Assumption
Safety is increased by increasing system or High reliability is neither necessary nor
component reliability; if components do not sufficient for safety.
fail, then accidents will not occur.
Accidents are caused by chains of directly Accidents are complex processes involving the
related events. We can understand accidents entire sociotechnical system. Traditional event-
and assess risk by looking at the chains of chain models cannot describe this process
events leading to the loss. adequately.
Probabilistic risk analysis based on event Risk and safety may be best understood and
chains is the best way to assess and communicated in ways other than probabilistic
communicate safety and risk information. risk analysis.
Most accidents are caused by operator error. Operator error is a product of the environment
Rewarding safe behavior and punishing unsafe in which it occurs. To reduce operator "error"
behavior will eliminate or reduce accidents we must change the environment in which the
significantly. operator works.
Highly reliable software is safe. Highly reliable software is not necessarily safe.
Increasing software reliability will have only
minimal impact on safety.
Major accidents occur from the chance Systems will tend to migrate toward states of
simultaneous occurrence of random events. higher risk. Such migration is predictable and
can be prevented by appropriate system design
or detected during operations using leading
indicators of increasing risk.
Assigning blame is necessary to learn from and Blame is the enemy of safety. Focus should be
prevent accidents or incidents. on understanding how the system behavior as a
whole contributed to the loss and not on who
or what to blame for it.
Scott McCarthy
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Systems Approach to Safety
By using a systems-based approach to safety, many of the limitations of chain event-based
causation models can be eliminated. Instead of focusing on linear causation and component
failures, systems-based approaches to safety aim to consider interactions between system
components. It is through these component interactions that systems achieve their emergent
properties (i.e. properties that are not the direct result of any particular component, but exist due
to the interactions of one or more components). Safety is one such emergent property of a
system, and as such the safety of a system can only be examined by considering the entire system
operating in the context of its environment. Safety depends on imposing constraints on the
behavior of the components in the system and their interactions [3].
STAMP Overview
In order to analyze system safety from a more holistic point of view, Dr. Leveson developed the
STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process) model of accident causation. In the
model, "systems are viewed as interrelated components kept in a state of dynamic equilibrium by
feedback control loops". Systems are also treated as dynamic processes that adapt to internal as
well as external changes [3]. STAMP analyzes system constraints, control loops, and process
models to identify inadequate control structures leading to hazards and preventative measures
that may be taken to reduce the effect of these hazards. The three basic concepts - safety
constraints, a hierarchical safety control structure, and process models - are discussed in greater
detail below:
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1. Safety Constraints - In the STAMP model, constraints are important because they are the
actions that were not enforced that allowed the events leading up to an accident to occur.
These controls can come in the form of human, automated, physical design, processes,
and/or social controls. If enforced, these controls have the potential to prevent unsafe
conditions.
2. Hierarchical safety control structure - In a hierarchical control structure, each component
of the system is arranged according to increasing levels of responsibility and control,
where each level of the hierarchy imposes constraints on the level below it. In this view,
"constraints or lack of constraints at a higher level allow or control lower-level behavior"
[3]. Inadequate control may result from missing constraints, inadequate safety control
commands, commands not executed properly at a lower level, or inadequately
communicated or processed feedback about constraint enforcement. To ensure safety,
sufficient communication must exist between levels of the control structure in both the
downward reference channel and the upward measurement channel.
GaWKPoIkmP
Figure 1 - Hierarchical Safety Control Structure Communication Channels [3]
3. Process models - Every process that is controlled requires that a process model be
present in the system. This is true whether the controller is automated or a human
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operator. The specific STAMP model conditions that must exist to control a process are
[3]:
a. Goal - The safety constraints that must be enforced by each controller in the
safety control structure
b. Action condition - The control action provided in the downward reference
channel
c. Observability condition - The feedback provided in the upward measurement
channel
d. Model condition - The controller's model of the process being controlled
In the STAMP model, accidents most often occur when the process model does not match the
process being controlled. The accident is attributed to one of the following conditions [3]:
1. The safety constraints were not enforced by the controller:
a. The control actions necessary to enforce the associated safety constraint were
missing or not provided;
b. The control actions necessary to enforce the associated safety constraint were
provided at the wrong time (too late/too early) or stopped too soon; or
c. Unsafe control actions were provided.
2. Appropriate control actions were provided but not followed.
Scott McCarthy
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Application of STAMP
Because STAMP is better suited to analyzing complex systems than more traditional causality
models, it was chosen to investigate the friendly fire accident examined in this thesis.
Specifically, it is believed that STAMP will be better suited to analyze the many socio-technical
interactions present in the multi-national and multi-force command structure that existed at the
time of the accident. In the following sections of this thesis an investigation of the accident will
be performed using the accident causality procedures known as CAST (Causal Analysis based on
STAMP). This approach to accident investigation aims to get away from assigning blame for an
accident and to identify why certain actions or interactions within the system led to a hazardous
state. Using CAST, the entire socio-technical structure is examined to help determine why the
accident occurred and to produce a set of recommendations that may help to prevent related, and
possibly unrelated, future accidents. The nine steps of CAST are [3]:
1. Identify the system(s) and hazard(s) involved in the accident.
2. Identify the system safety constraints and system requirements associated with that
hazard.
3. Document the safety control structure in place to control the hazard and enforce the
safety constraints. This structure includes the roles and responsibilities of each
component in the structure as well as the controls provided or created to execute their
responsibilities and the relevant feedback provided to them to help them do this.
4. Determine the proximate events leading to the loss.
5. Analyze the loss at the physical system level (e.g. in the case of ZG710, the aircraft, the
flight crew, the Patriot battery, and the battery crew). Identify the contribution of each of
the following to the events: physical and operational controls, physical failures,
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dysfunctional interactions, communication and coordination flaws, and unhandled
disturbances. Determine why the physical controls in place were ineffective in preventing
the hazard.
6. Moving up the levels of the safety control structure, determine how and why each
successive higher level allowed or contributed to the inadequate control at the current
level. This step contains the bulk of the analysis and will include:
a. For each system safety constraint, determine if responsibility for enforcing the
constraint was never assigned to a component in the safety control structure, or if
a component did not exercise adequate control to enforce the constraint.
b. Develop an understanding of any human decisions or flawed control actions in
terms of: the information available to the decision maker as well as what
information was not available, the context in which the decision-making occurred,
the reasons for the underlying decision, and any flaws in the process models of
those making the decisions.
7. Analyze the overall coordination and communication contributors to the accident.
8. Determine if there were any changes to the safety control structure over time that may
have contributed to the migration of the system toward a higher state of risk.
9. Generate recommendations.
Scott McCarthy
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Chapter 3. Case Study Accident Description - Proximal Event
Chain
On 22 Mar 03 a pair of Tornado aircraft from the Royal Air Force were returning from a combat
mission over Iraq [5]. At 2348 hrs the second aircraft, ZG710, was incorrectly identified as an
Anti-Radiation missile and destroyed by a US Patriot missile. Both crewmembers were killed
instantly. Below is an approximate timeline of the events leading up to the missile intercept:
ZG710 Patriot Missile Battery
Flight preparation, including inspection of Monitored airspace for Iraqi Tactical
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system Ballistic Missiles (TBMs)
Engine startup and takeoff
Completed mission over Iraq
Returned to Kuwaiti airspace Detect ZG71 0 in airspace
Completed aircraft checks; crew noted that
IFF switches were set correctly
Aircraft began descent towards Ali Al System classified ZG710 as an incoming
Salem airbase Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM)
ZG710 interrogated for IFF; no response
received
Aircraft was struck by Patriot missile Patriot crew launched a surface-to-air
missile in self-defense
Scott McCarthy
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Examination of the ejection seats confirmed that neither crewmember initiated ejection and both
were killed instantly.
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Chapter 4. Ministry of Defence Investigation and Findings
After the accident an official Royal Air Force (RAF) Board of Inquiry was conducted to
determine the cause of the accident and to make recommendations about how accidents like this
may be prevented in the future [5]. The inquiry was conducted in parallel with investigations
performed by the US Army. Information was shared openly between the two investigating
bodies. Data was obtained from the flight data recorder and from interviews with British and US
personnel.
The RAF Board concluded that the following factors contributed to the accident: Patriot Anti-
Radiation Missile classification criteria; Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules of Engagement;
Patriot firing doctrine and crew training; Autonomous Patriot battery operation; Patriot IFF
procedure; ZG71O's IFF serviceability; aircraft routing and airspace controls measures, and
Orders and Instructions.
Patriot System Anti-Radiation Missile Classification
The Patriot system identifies ARMs based on several criteria, including flight profile and lack of
an IFF response. In order to classify a wide variety of ARMs throughout the world, the range of
ARM criteria in the Patriot system can be very broad. The Board determined that in this accident
the ZG7 10's flight profile met the Patriot ARM criteria as it began to descend into Ali Al Salem.
Additionally, the Board determined that the ARM criteria should have been narrowed to more
closely match that of threats known to be in the Iraqi theater.
Scott McCarthy
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Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile Rules of Engagement
The Board determined that the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) governing the engagement of
ARMs were not robust enough to prevent friendly aircraft from being classified as ARMs and
then engaged in self-defense.
Patriot Firing Doctrine and Training
The Patriot operators had been trained to react quickly to threats and engage early. Additionally,
they were trained to trust the system. In this situation the crew had only about a minute to decide
whether to engage; had they waited, the Board determined that the track might have been
reclassified. Even though the crew had been fully trained, their training had focused on
recognizing generic threats, not those that were present in the Iraqi theater. The Board also
determined that the crew had not been trained on identifying false alarms.
Autonomous Patriot Battery Operation
At the time of the accident, the Patriot battery was operating autonomously, protecting ground
troops from missile attack. Since the battery's communications kit was still being shipped from
the US, the battery had no direct method to communicate with the Battalion HQ. Instead a radio
relay was set up with another Patriot battery that did have full voice and data links with Battalion
HQ. Because of this lack of communication, the Patriot crew did not have access to the full air
picture. They had no redundant methods to determine the identity of ZG710. Even in this
reduced operational state the ROEs allowed the battery to engage tracks in self-defense. The
Board considered it likely that a better understanding of the overall air picture would have helped
the crew and made them more likely to correctly identify ZG710 as a friendly aircraft.
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Patriot IFF Procedures
IFF is used to automatically identify friendly aircraft. A signal is sent to the aircraft, which
replies with a particular code. This code is then checked against a known set of codes to
determine if the aircraft responded correctly. Of the 5 different IFF modes, Mode 1 (an
unencrypted code used in Iraq by all Coalition aircraft) and Mode 4 (encrypted) were used in the
theater.
An investigation concluded that the Mode 4 interrogator at the Patriot battery was working
properly throughout the engagement period, but that Mode 1 codes were not loaded. The Board
concluded that the lack of a data link to the Battalion likely contributed to the difficulty of
acquiring and loading Mode 1 IFF codes. This lack of Mode 1 codes increased the probability of
misidentification.
ZG710's IFF System
The Board examined the following aspects of ZG71O's IFF System:
IFF Serviceability
A satisfactory ground check was performed on ZG71O's Mode 4 IFF and a Rapier Missile unit
that regularly checked the IFF of departing aircraft did not log a fault. There is no evidence that
ZG710 responded to any IFF interrogations during the mission. However, there is evidence that
the navigator checked the IFF switches at appropriate times. The Board deduced that ZG7 10
experienced an IFF fault, since a positive Mode 4 response would have prevented the ARM
classification and subsequent engagement.
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Failure Modes
After the investigation, it was discovered that an indication of certain IFF power failures might
not be displayed to the crew. The Board determined that a power failure would also be the most
likely explanation of the absence of an IFF response.
Aircrew Actions
The Board determined that the navigator did not accidentally or consciously disable the IFF
system.
Ultimately, the Board concluded that ZG710 experienced an IFF fault, which was unknown to
the aircrew and which prevented an IFF response. This lack off IFF was determined to be a
contributory factor.
Aircraft Routing and Airspace Control Measures
The Board determined that ZG710 followed the established speed and altitude procedures for an
approach to Ali Al Salem. They also speculated that had the position of the Patriot batteries and
"likely" missile arcs been taken into account in the writing of the procedures, ZG710 might have
taken a different route. Additionally, procedures were in place to deal with IFF failures, but the
crew would have needed to be aware of the failure to implement the procedures.
Instructions
The Board determined that the instructions available to aircrew operating without IFF were
misleading.
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Recommendations
In addition to standard recommendations about distributing the report and sharing information
with US partners, the Board made the following recommendations:
e Conduct further research into the failure modes, reliability and serviceability of the
Tornado IFF system.
e Implement closer coordination between planning and operations regarding airspace
usage.
The Commander-In-Chief of the Royal Air Force Strike Command reviewed the report and made
the following additional recommendations:
- Complete a positive challenge and response IFF check on every aircraft after takeoff.
e Modify the Tornado IFF installation to ensure that the cockpit warning is triggered in
all failure modes.
- Examine operational doctrine to enhance airspace coordination.
In the end, the RAF board found no fault with the soldiers operating the US Patriot battery. It
was determined that this was an unfortunate accident in an otherwise successful and efficient
war. ZG710 was the only RAF aircraft lost during the war. The Board highlighted various
complex, contributory factors and made recommendations to correct any shortcomings found
through the investigation.
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Chapter 5. Defense Science Board Task Force Findings
In January 2005, the Defense Science Board Task Force issued a report on Patriot System
Performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Detailed in the report were lessons learned
regarding the Patriot system as well as the general topics of combat identification and situational
awareness [1].
The Task Force first assessed Patriot's overall performance as a defense against Tactical Ballistic
Missiles (TBMs). 62 Patriot fire units (40 US and 22 coalition) were deployed in the theater,
utilizing a combination of upgraded PAC-2 missiles as well as the new PAC-3 missiles. In total,
all nine TBMs that threatened areas defended by the Patriot system were successfully engaged.
None of the TBMs caused any damage or loss of life.
Despite Patriot's success in defending against TBMs, there were three unfortunate fratricide
incidents, one of which was discussed in the previous chapter. Again, the report cited a complex
chain of events and failures, and identified several shortfalls to be corrected.
First, the Task Force cited poor combat identification performance of the Mode IV IFF system.
Poor Mode IV performance had been seen in many training exercises, yet had not resulted in a
robust fix. Given that there were over 41,000 flights of coalition aircraft and over 60 Patriot fire
units deployed, the number of possible friendly observations was in the millions. Even low-
probability issues are likely to surface given several million opportunities. The Task Force stated
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the need to fix Mode IV IFF and institute additional protection measures, such as safe return
corridors.
Next, the report identified a serious lack of situational awareness by air defense units in OIF.
Major systems, such as Patriot, AWACS, and AEGIS are not always able to share and assimilate
all available battle space information. The Task Force believed that the US military was still a
long way from the vision of seamless information sharing and correlation. In the case of Patriot,
the closest source of air picture information is the Patriot Battalion HQ, yet in the accident
involving ZG710, that link was weak, at best.
Finally, the Task Force cited shortfalls in the Patriot operating philosophy, protocols, displays,
and software. At the time, Patriot was designed to withstand heavy missile attacks; much of the
system operated automatically, with no user input, and the operators were trained to trust the
system. However, this was not the environment seen in OIF. Instead, during the 30 days of
operations, there were only 9 engagements of TBMs in a battle space that contained 41,000
coalition aircraft sorties. The ratio of friendly-to-enemy aircraft was 4,000-to-1. Such an
environment does not necessitate the need for a mostly automated system. The Task Force cited
the need for changes in software, displays, and training to deal with Patriot's ever-changing
mission.
In order to fix these shortcomings, the Task Force recommended that Mode IV IFF problems
must be fixed and that air defense systems need improved situational awareness. They also
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recommended that the Patriot system needs to shift its operational protocols to allow for more
operator oversight and control of major system actions.
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Chapter 6. CAST Analysis
As outlined in Leveson's Engineering a Safer World [3], the Causal Analysis based on STAMP
(CAST) approach to accident investigation aims to get away from assigning blame for an
accident and to identify why certain actions or interactions within the system led to a hazardous
state. Using CAST, the entire socio-technical structure is examined to help determine why the
accident occurred and to produce a set of recommendations that may help to prevent related, and
possibly unrelated, future accidents. The nine steps of CAST are [3]:
1. Identify the system(s) and hazard(s) involved in the accident.
2. Identify the system safety constraints and system requirements associated with that
hazard.
3. Document the safety control structure in place to control the hazard and enforce the
safety constraints. This structure includes the roles and responsibilities of each
component in the structure as well as the controls provided or created to execute their
responsibilities and the relevant feedback provided to them to help them do this.
4. Determine the proximate events leading to the loss.
5. Analyze the loss at the physical system level (e.g. in the case of ZG710, the aircraft, the
flight crew, the Patriot battery, and the battery crew). Identify the contribution of each of
the following to the events: physical and operational controls, physical failures,
dysfunctional interactions, communication and coordination flaws, and unhandled
disturbances. Determine why the physical controls in place were ineffective in preventing
the hazard.
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6. Moving up the levels of the safety control structure, determine how and why each
successive higher level allowed or contributed to the inadequate control at the current
level. This step contains the bulk of the analysis and will include:
a. For each system safety constraint, determine if responsibility for enforcing the
constraint was never assigned to a component in the safety control structure, or if
a component did not exercise adequate control to enforce the constraint.
b. Develop an understanding of any human decisions or flawed control actions in
terms of: the information available to the decision maker as well as what
information was not available, the context in which the decision-making occurred,
the reasons for the underlying decision, and any flaws in the process models of
those making the decisions.
7. Analyze the overall coordination and communication contributors to the accident.
8. Determine if there were any changes to the safety control structure over time that may
have contributed to the migration of the system toward a higher state of risk.
9. Generate recommendations.
Step 1 - System Definition and Hazards
System Definition
The system being analyzed is the prevention of friendly-fire incidents between a ground-based
air defense missile system and friendly aircraft operating in the same theater.
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System Hazard
The accident in question occurred because several hazardous conditions exist. First, a friendly
aircraft was operating within range of an air defense missile system. The accident could not
occur if the aircraft were outside of the engagement range of the missile system. Second, that
aircraft was incorrectly identified as hostile after being misclassified as an ARM. While the
misclassification lead to the hostile identification, this condition is not strictly a necessary
criterion. A missile system could presumably fail to identify or classify a target and still allow
for an engagement. Finally, the friendly aircraft was engaged and the missile intercepted the
aircraft. Therefore, the three system level hazards associated with this accident are:
1. A friendly aircraft was operating within range of an air defense missile system.
2. The aircraft was not correctly identified as a friendly aircraft.
3. The aircraft was engaged by the missile system.
Step 2 - System Safety Constraints and System Requirements
System Safety Constraints
The system level safety constraints that must be enforced to address these hazards are:
1. Friendly aircraft must be properly identified as friendly.
2. Measures must be taken to ensure that missiles are not launched at friendly aircraft.
3. In the event of a missile launch against a friendly aircraft, there must be a way to
terminate the engagement.
4. All friendly activity must be coordinated between air and ground forces to control
interactions.
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It should be noted that while the one of the hazards identified was "a friendly aircraft was
operating within range of an air defense missile system", there is no way to remove this hazard
while still performing the mission required in the battle space. In fact, the removal of this hazard
removes the necessity for the system in question (i.e. preventing friendly-fire incidents between a
ground-based air defense missile system and friendly aircraft operating in the same theater).
There are, however, actions that can be taken to reduce the potential consequences of this hazard.
System Requirements
The system requirements necessary to prevent the system hazards and enforce the safety
constraints are:
1. Aircraft must positively identify themselves as friendly when requested.
2. Positive identification codes must be displayed to the operators of the missile system
when received.
3. Alternative methods for aircraft identification must be available in case the primary
identification channels have failed.
4. Operators must be trained on identification criteria.
5. Operators must be trained on Rules of Engagement.
6. The missile system must allow the operator enough control to terminate ongoing
engagements.
A mapping of system hazards to system-level requirements and constraints is provided in Table 1.
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Hazards System Requirements
I A friendly aircraft was operating within All friendly activity must be
range of an air defense missile system. coordinated between air and ground
forces to control interactions
2 The aircraft was not correctly identified Friendly aircraft must be properly
as a friendly aircraft. identified as friendly
Aircraft must positively identify
themselves as friendly when requested.
Positive identification codes must be
displayed to the operators of the missile
system when received.
Alternative methods for aircraft
identification must be available in case
the primary identification channels have
failed.
Operators must be trained on
identification criteria.
3 The aircraft was engaged by the missile Operators must be trained on Rules of
system. Engagement.
Measures must be taken to ensure that
missiles are not launched at friendly
aircraft.
The missile system must allow the
operator enough control to terminate
ongoing engagements.
Table 1 - System Hazards and Requirements
Step 3 - Hierarchical System Safety Control Structure
The hierarchical system safety control structure for combat operations in Iraq is contained
in Figure 2. A brief overview of the command structure follows; more detailed descriptions
of roles and responsibilities at each level of the hierarchy are provided later in the CAST
analysis.
Overview of System Hierarchical Control Structures Roles and Responsibilities
According to the report issued by the Ministry of Defence following the accident, the
command and control arrangements in the theater were based on standard Allied and UK
Joint doctrine [5]. At the highest level was the Combined Operational Headquarters in
Qatar, commanded jointly by a 4-star US officer and a 3-star UK National Contingent
Commander. Below this were two operations commands: one for air and one for land
forces. The air campaign was handled by the US-led Combined Air Operations Center at
Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, commanded by a USAF 3-star General with an
RAF 2-star on staff. The center was responsible for all air operations, including airspace
co-ordination and control of all air defenses. The Land Component Commander at Camp
Doha, Kuwait, was responsible for US Army ground-based air defense. Liaison elements
were positioned at both Land and Air Component HQs.
At the tactical level, the Tornado aircraft was operating out of an RAF combat air wing
based at Ali Al Salem in Kuwait. The Patriot battery emplaced at Camp Doha, Kuwait
fell under the direct command of its Battalion HQ.
Combined Operational Headquarters
Tactical Doctrine
La Oprtin Command
Rules of
Engagement Ii
Training 4____
Air Wing
mi.ioninfermadon
Ident codes
Rules of Engagement
Aircraft
Not operational
7
:Radio relay
voice comm
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Figure 2 - Operational Control Structure
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Step 4 - Proximal Event Chain
The proximal event chain was discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis and is based on the
Ministry of Defence Aircraft Accident Summary.
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Step 5 - Analyzing the Physical Process
In this part of the CAST analysis, the physical system (i.e. the interaction between the
Patriot battery and ZG710) is analyzed with the purpose of identifying unsafe system
interactions, component failures, or inadequate system controls that contributed to the
events. The goal is to determine why the controls in place at the time of the accident were
not sufficient to prevent the incident [3].
Figure 3 provides a summary of the safety requirements and constraints violated within
the physical system, the safety equipment present in the system, the physical failures and
inadequate controls, and the physical contextual factors. Several items within the analysis
should be discussed in further detail:
Inadequate Controls to Prevent the Engagement of a Friendly Aircraft:
Based on the findings presented by the MOD [5], it is clear that at least two system
inadequacies contributed greatly to the engagement of ZG710: 1) the incorrect ARM
classification by the Patriot system; 2) the failure to identify ZG710 as a friendly aircraft.
Each of these shortcomings was directly responsible for the accident.
First, as ZG710 rapidly descended toward the Ali Al Salem airbase, the Patriot battery's
computer system determined that ZG7 10's flight path matched the programmed criteria
for an ARM. This classification was most likely caused by the need for Patriot to be able
to detect a wide variety of ARMs. Patriot units are emplaced all around the world and the
system needs to be able to detect and classify a large number of different ARMs with
varying flight characteristics. The MOD report cited a need for ARM classification
criteria to be narrowed down to those expected to be encountered in a given operating
theater [5].
Next is the failure to identify ZG71 0 as a friendly aircraft. This shortcoming was likely
caused by two distinct factors. First, the accident investigation showed that ZG710 never
responded to the IFF Mode IV interrogation requests from the Patriot battery. It is
believed that a power supply failure was responsible for the lack of response. Second, the
Patriot battery had no data link with the Patriot Battalion HQ. This meant that no IFF
Mode 1 codes were loaded and that the battery could not receive external identification
information, such as that provided by an AWACS or any other similar system. Therefore,
the Patriot battery was reliant on one source of target identification (IFF Mode IV), which
ultimately failed.
Inadequate Feedback to Aircrew:
Throughout the preflight, the mission, and the landing approach, the crew of ZG710
thought that their IFF equipment was working properly and would indicate a friendly
status to any coalition systems interrogating them. The crew was never notified that a
power supply failure was causing their IFF Mode IV system to stop functioning.
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Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated:
- Aircraft must positively identify themselves as friendly when requested
- Alternative methods for aircraft identification must be available in case the primary
identification channels have failed
* Measures must be taken to ensure that missiles are not launched at friendly aircraft
Emergency and Safety Equipment (Controls):
- Fault detection equipment
" Operator displays for status of IFF equipment
Failures and Inadequate Controls:
- IFF system on ZG710 never responded to IFF Mode IV interrogation
- Inadequate indicators of IFF Mode IV failure on ZG71 0. The crew was never notified
that the system was not operational. It is suspected that a power supply failure caused
the non-operational state.
e Inadequate data links between Patriot battery and Patriot Battalion HQ. The Patriot
battery had no source of external identification information.
* ARM classification criteria at the Patriot battery were too broad for the operating
theater.
Physical Contextual Factors:
* The Patriot battery's communication equipment was still in transit from the US. This
led to the degradation of the battery's communication status and eliminated the
battery's external data links.
- The Patriot battery's main role at the time of the incident was to protect Camp Doha
from incoming missiles.
- Patriot personnel were trained to trust the system's classifications.
Figure 3 - Physical Plant Level Analysis
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Step 6 - Analyzing the Higher Levels of the Safety Control Structure
Now that the inadequacies in the physical system have been investigated it will be helpful
to examine the higher levels of the hierarchical safety control structure to understand why
the inadequacies in the physical system occurred. Using the CAST procedures previously
outlined, each level of the safety control structure will be examined, focusing on why
failures occurred at each level and why the operators at lower levels acted they way they
did [3].
Patriot Missile Battery
The Patriot missile battery was emplaced near Camp Doha and was executing its primary
mission of protecting ground troops from missile attacks coming from Iraq. The battery
crew was positioned inside the battery's control station and was responsible for
monitoring the air picture displayed on the station's displays and making identification
and engagement decisions. They controlled the system through a series of switches and
tabular displays used to input data.
Figure 4 summarizes the violated constraints and requirements, failures and inadequate
controls, operational context, and process model flaws at the Patriot battery. The Patriot
battery crew is the component in the safety control structure with the most direct control
over the events leading up to the accident. The safety requirements and constraints
violated include not properly identifying ZG710 as a friendly aircraft, misclassifying
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ZG710 as an ARM, and not having alternate identification methods available. The CAST
analysis of this level of the safety control structure identified several inadequate controls:
IFF Mode 1 codes were not loaded - Since Mode 1 codes were not loaded at the
Patriot battery, the system was relying solely on IFF Mode IV to provide
identification of friendly aircraft. The Mode 1 codes would have served as a
double-check to the lack of Mode IV response by ZG710. The primary reason for
the absence of IFF Mode 1 codes seems to be the lack of a data link to the
Battalion HQ. Normally this link is used to transmit operational setup information
to the battery. The absence of the link would have required the battery crew to
manually obtain the IFF codes from another source and then to manually enter the
codes through the system's tabular displays.
e No data link to Battalion HQ - Because the battery's communication suite was
still in transit, the system had no way of receiving external identification
information and was reliant only on directly observable identification information
(e.g. IFF codes). Without a data link, the battery crew was reliant on a voice
communication relay through an adjacent Patriot battery. However, this voice
relay would have been ineffective during the presumed ARM attack because of
the long delays in transmitting and receiving voice communications over this link.
It is unlikely that there would have been an adequate amount of time for the
battery crew to speak with someone at Battalion HQ and determine that ZG710
was not a true threat.
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- Broad ARM classification criteria - The ARM classification criteria that were
pre-programmed into the system were not modified to more accurately represent
the expected threats in the Iraqi theater.
To address the control inadequacies, this CAST analysis recommends the following
actions be taken:
e Since two of the inadequate controls were the direct result of the Patriot battery
operating in autonomous mode (no Mode 1 IFF codes and no external
identification information), the US Army should examine its operating procedures
to determine if allowing this type of operation is prudent when operating in a
theater where friendly aircraft greatly outnumber potential threats. When there is
only one source of classification and identification, there is a much greater chance
of safety-related accidents.
e Modify Patriot battery operational procedures to ensure that ARM classification
criteria are sufficiently limited to match the expected threats in the theater and to
avoid improperly classifying aircraft.
Scott McCarthy
MIT SDM Thesis Page 39
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
- Friendly aircraft was not properly identified as friendly
- Friendly aircraft misclassified as Anti-Radiation Missile
- No alternative identification methods available
Failures and Inadequate Controls
- IFF Mode 1 codes were not loaded
* No data links to Battalion HQ, resulting in an incomplete air picture
* Broad ARM classification criteria misclassified Tornado as ARM
Operational Context
e Broad ARM classification criteria were based on many ARMs observed worldwide.
- Rules of Engagement allowed Patriot crew to engage ARMs in self-defense.
e The battery's communication suite still in transit from US. Contact with Battalion HQ
was via radio relay with a nearby battery, which was equipped with voice and data
links to Battalion HQ. No data link was present between the involved battery and
Battalion HQ.
- The battery was running in autonomous mode (no external data link) to protect ground
troops from missile attack. Missile defense was the battery's primary mission and
explains why the battery was allowed to operate in autonomous mode.
e Crew had been trained to trust the classifications determined by the system.
Process Model Flaws
* Battery crew believed that they were engaging an ARM in self-defense.
e Battery crew believed that IFF Mode IV would be sufficient to identify friendly
aircraft.
Figure 4 - Patriot Battery Level Analysis
ZG710 (Aircraft) Crew
The RAF aircraft was operating in Iraqi airspace as part of a package of Coalition aircraft
just prior to the incident. While performing a combat landing (maintaining a high altitude
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until just prior to approach and then diving rapidly toward the runway) at Ali Al Salem,
the aircraft was misclassified as an ARM.
The safety constraint violated at this level of the safety control structure was a failure to
positively identify the aircraft as friendly when interrogated by an IFF system. The CAST
analysis of this level of the safety control structure identified several inadequate controls:
* Presumed IFF Failure - It is presumed that a power supply failure led to the
failure of ZG7 10 to provide a valid response to the IFF Mode IV interrogation,
since no other IFF failure was reported and no IFF responses were received by the
Patriot battery (which was equipped with an embedded data recorder). There is no
firm evidence that ZG710 responded to any IFF interrogations throughout its
mission.
- All IFF modes were not checked before takeoff- The IFF Mode IV system was
checked prior to engine start by the ground crew. However, the other IFF modes
were not checked. Additionally, according to the MOD report [5] an RAF
Regiment Rapier Missile unit that regularly checked the IFF of departing aircraft
did not report the aircraft or log a fault.
e Crew received no indication of IFF failures - The crew of the aircraft received no
visual feedback that their IFF system had failed. According to the MOD report,
this was presumably caused by a power supply failure. The IFF system on ZG710
was set up to report failures within the IFF system to the aircraft crew, but
investigation of the aircraft's systems concluded that if a power supply failure
occurred, then no indication would have been presented to the crew.
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To address the control inadequacies, this CAST analysis agrees with the MOD report and
recommends that the ZG710 IFF system should be modified to ensure that a visual
indication is provided to the aircraft crew in all failure modes. Had the crew known of the
IFF failure, then measures could have been taken to prevent misidentification of the
aircraft.
Figure 5 - ZG710 Level Analysis
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Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
* Aircraft did not positively identify itself as friendly
Failures and Inadequate Controls
- Presumed IFF failure
e All IFF modes were not checked before takeoff
e Crew received no indication of IFF failure
Operational Context
- Flight profile matched ARM classification at Patriot battery.
- Only IFF Mode 4 was checked on the ground.
Process Model Flaws
* Tornado crew believed that IFF was working properly. The IFF Mode IV system was
checked by ground crew prior to takeoff. Checks were performed in the aircraft when
returning to Kuwait airspace, including noting that IFF switches were set correctly.
Patriot Battalion HO
The Patriot Battalion HQ is the component of the safety control structure responsible for
coordinating the operations of all Patriot batteries in the area. In this incident the battalion
HQ was located at Camp Doha, near the Patriot battery. However, unlike most tactical
operations, the battalion HQ had limited control over the Patriot battery, due to a non-
functional data link between the two units. Normally, this data link allows the battalion
HQ to provide the battery with external identification information, IFF codes, and a more
integrated air picture.
The safety constraints violated at this level of the safety control structure were: 1) a
failure to provide alternate identification information to the Patriot battery, 2) a failure to
properly train Patriot operators on identification criteria. The CAST analysis of this level
of the safety control structure identified several inadequate controls:
e Did not provide instructions to Patriot batteries to restrict ARM classification
criteria - There were two conditions leading to this failure. First, the data link to
the Patriot battery was not operational, which inhibited the transfer of theater-
specific threat information that could have been used to narrow the broad ARM
classification criteria. Second, even though the data link was down, the battalion
HQ failed to provide these instructions to the battery through the voice
communication relay that had been established through an adjacent battery. Had
the crew been instructed, they could have manually entered pertinent ARM
classification criteria into the system through a series of tabular displays.
- Allowed Patriot Battery to operate without alternative identification methods -
The battalion HQ allowed the battery to operate in an autonomous mode, which
restricted the battalion's ability to transfer identification information to the
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battery. Additionally, the battery was allowed to operate without IFF Mode 1
codes loaded. These two failures resulted in the battery operating in a state in
which IFF Mode IV was the only source of identification information. The battery
was allowed to operate in this mode to defend the ground troops at Camp Doha
against Iraqi missile attacks. It is unclear whether the Battalion HQ considered the
potential for the misclassification and misidentification of a friendly aircraft when
deciding to allow this mode of operation.
- Did not provide adequate training on target identification - The crew of the
Patriot battery were not provided with sufficient training related to target
identification while running in an autonomous state. Instead they were instructed
to trust the classifications provided by the system.
Two recommendations for the Patriot system have already been addressed in the CAST
analysis of the Patriot battery component. In addition to the recommendations at the
battery level, this CAST analysis recommends the following actions be taken:
- Ensure that ARM classification criteria are restricted to correctly classify the
types of threats in the operating theater without being so broad as to increase the
likelihood of false positives. It may be necessary to transmit this information via
alternative means when the primary communication link is not functional.
e Provide operators with sufficient training on target identification. This training
should concentrate on identification when the primary identification mechanisms
are not functional. Rather than trusting the system to make the correct
classifications, battery crews should be trained to identify flight characteristics
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and determine whether it is necessary to override the system's automatic
classification.
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
- Did not provide alternate identification information to Patriot battery
e Operators were not properly trained on identification criteria
Failures and Inadequate Controls
- Did not provide instructions to Patriot batteries to restrict ARM classification criteria
e Allowed Patriot Battery to operate without alternative identification methods
e Did not provide adequate training on target identification
Operational Context
e Allowed Patriot battery to operate autonomously to meet a mission requirement of
protecting ground troops from missile attacks
Process Model Flaws
- It is possible that the Battalion believed that operating autonomously would not hinder
the ability to identify friendly aircraft, since the IFF system should have been able to
make such an identification.
Figure 6 - Patriot Battalion HQ Level Analysis
RAF Air Wing
The RAF Air Wing at Ali Al Salem airbase was responsible for the execution of combat
missions and for the maintenance of all aircraft in the Air Wing. It is here that ground
crew checked the IFF Mode IV system on ZG7 10. Despite this action, the Air Wing
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violated a safety constraint by not ensuring that ZG710 would be able to properly identify
itself as friendly. Specifically, the Air Wing had the following inadequate controls:
- All IFF modes were not checked prior to takeoff - Only IFF Mode IV was
checked on the ground. The other IFF modes, including Mode 1, which was to be
used by all coalition aircraft, were not verified. This is important, because there is
no evidence that ZG710 responded to any IFF interrogations throughout the
duration of the mission.
e IFF responses were not checked while the aircraft was in flight - According to the
MOD report [5], it was normal procedure for all aircraft to be checked for IFF
responses by a Rapier missile unit immediately after takeoff. For unknown
reasons, it appears that this did not happen on the day of the incident. The MOD
report states that the Rapier unit "did not report the aircraft or log a fault." It is
possible that the Rapier unit experienced an IFF fault similar to the presumed IFF
fault on ZG71 0, or that the unit failed to interrogate the aircraft or note the lack of
a Mode IV response. Furthermore, ZG710 was not checked for IFF responses at
any other control point during the mission. Because of this, no one was aware of
ZG710's IFF fault.
To address the control inadequacies, this CAST analysis agrees with the MOD report and
recommends that all IFF modes must be checked prior to takeoff. IFF is one of the
primary methods used to prevent friendly-fire incidents. Given the crucial nature of the
IFF system and the potential for faults, proper operation of a unit's IFF system should be
a mandatory criterion for that unit's participation in a combat mission.
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Additionally, a positive challenge and response check should be performed immediately
after takeoff and at any handoff to a new control authority. An aircraft's pilots must be
made aware of the status of any faulty IFF system responses so that appropriate actions
may be taken to correct the issue, or make up for lack of such an important safeguard.
Finally, an investigation should be performed to determine why the lack of IFF responses
by ZG710 was not reported during the mission. It is common practice for aircraft entering
a controlled airspace to be interrogated by some type of air traffic control system (e.g. an
AWACS controller). There is no mention in the MOD report or the Task Force report of
ZG7 10 being interrogated by such a control system. It is possible that a series of IFF
checks at appropriate control points could have identified ZG71O's presumed IFF fault
and measures could have been taken to prevent the fratricide.
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Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
- Did not ensure that ZG710 would be able to properly identify itself as friendly
ailures and Inadequate Controls
- All IFF modes were not checked prior to takeoff
e IFF responses were not checked while the aircraft was in flight
Process Model Flaws
- Believed that ZG7 10's IFF system was performing correctly based on the IFF
Mode IV check that was performed prior to takeoff.
e Believed that any IFF faults that occurred during the flight would be reported to
the pilots
Figure 7 - RAF Air Wing Level Analysis
Land Operations Command
The Land Operations Command was based at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and was responsible
for US Army ground-based air defense. In this role, they ensured that all US troops were
protected from missile attacks and enemy aircraft. According to the MOD Report [5], the
Land and Air Operations centers contained liaison elements to help ensure coordination
between the two units. In spite of this, it appears that the Land Operations Command
violated the safety constraint and did not notify its air defense units of the close proximity
of friendly aircraft. The failures at this level of the safety control structure were not
providing a complete air picture to missile defense units and not properly coordinating
friendly activity between air and ground forces.
Scott McCarthy
MIT SDM Thesis Page 48
The root cause of these control failures appears to be a lack of communication and
coordination with the Air Operations center in spite of the liaison elements that were
positioned at each command. It is unclear from the reports why such a breakdown in
communication occurred, but this type of breakdown is not uncommon when dealing
with multi-national troops from different branches of the armed services.
To address these control failure, this CAST analysis recommends that current operational
protocol be reviewed with respect to providing complete air picture information to
missile defense units. During this incident the Patriot battery had no external
identification information. A review of operational protocol could provide an insight into
why the battery was allowed to operate in such a detached method of operation.
Additionally, the communication between the Air Operations Command and the Land
Operations Command should be improved. Areas of concern include the definition and
enforcement of airspace control measures, such as safe-passage corridors and the
coordination of identification information, especially IFF codes.
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Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
- Did not notify air defense units of close proximity of friendly aircraft.
Failures and Inadequate Controls
- Did not properly coordinate friendly activity between air and ground forces
- Did not provide complete air picture to missile defense units
Context
- A liaison element existed between Air Operations and Land Operations, but
appeared to be ineffective in coordinating activities.
Figure 8 - Land Operations Command Level Analysis
Air Operations Command
The Air Operations Command was based at Prince Sultan Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia
and commanded by a USAF 3-star General with an RAF 2-star on staff. This unit was
responsible for air operations including airspace coordination and tactical control of all
air defenses, however they did not have direct control over the Patriot batteries at Camp
Doha, which fell under command of the Land Operations center. The primary safety
constraint violated by the Air Operations command was the inability to limit interactions
between air and ground units. It appears that there was very limited coordination of
coalition aircraft missions between this unit and the Land Operations Command, even
though there were liaison elements positioned at each unit. The specific control
inadequacy at this level of the safety control structure was that speed and height
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procedures for approach to Ali Al Salem air base did not account for position of Patriot
batteries. These procedures were one of the contributing factors to the Patriot battery's
misclassification of ZG710 as an Anti-Radiation Missile.
To address this control inadequacy, this CAST analysis recommends that approach
patterns and published speed and altitude restrictions must take into account the presence
of any nearby missile defense systems. Other airspace control measures such as the
definition and enforcement of safe-passage corridors may also help to ensure the safety of
aircraft entering or leaving a controlled airspace.
Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
* Did not limit interaction between air and ground units
Failures and Inadequate Controls
e Speed and height procedures for approach to Ali Al Salem air base did not
account for position of Patriot batteries
Figure 9 - Combined Air Operations Command Level Analysis
Combined Operational Headquarters
At this level of the safety control structure, the oversight of Land Operations and Air
Operations are combined into a single Operational Headquarters. This command was
based in Qatar, and was led by a 4-star US officer and a 3-star UK National Contingent
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Commander and had overall command of the war in Iraq. The primary safety constraint
that was violated at this level was that friendly air and ground activities were not
coordinated to limit the interactions between the two operational entities. Specifically, the
following inadequate controls were uncovered by this CAST analysis:
- Policies for IFF checkout were not complete -The primary identification
mechanism employed by friendly aircraft is IFF. Because of the importance of
this system, policies need to be in place to ensure the proper functioning of this
system at all times. Yet, ZG71 0 was allowed to fly its mission without all IFF
modes being checked prior to takeoff and without its IFF responses being checked
throughout the mission. Even if all of ZG71O's IFF modes had been checked on
the ground, chances still exist for a misconfigured IFF system since the
verification of IFF codes would be performed by the personnel responsible for
loading IFF codes into the aircraft. The ground crew performing this verification
would presumably use the same codes they just loaded into the IFF system to
verify its proper operation. This type of check is adequate to verify that the IFF
system is operational, but inadequate in ensuring that the proper code set was
loaded. Additionally, the Patriot battery was allowed to operate without a full set
of IFF codes.
- Policies for interactions between air and ground forces operating in close
proximity were inadequate -Airspace control procedures were not in place to
limit the interactions of coalition aircraft and missile defense systems. Airspace
control measures were not identified and commanded down to subordinate units.
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- Policies surrounding ARM classification were not restrictive enough to prevent
misclassifications - Because the ARM classification criteria is so broad in the
Patriot system, policies should have been in place to restrict the criteria to match
those of expected threats in the operating theater.
To address these control inadequacies, this CAST analysis recommends the following:
- Policies regarding the use of IFF systems should be investigated to ensure that
this important safeguard is fully operational at all times. Specifically the policies
should address potential system failures, positive challenge and response checks
at various points during a mission, and system operation without a full set of
codes. It is important that any IFF verification be performed by an independent
system to verify that the correct IFF code sets were loaded into all systems present
in the theater.
" Policies regarding airspace coordination should be investigated to ensure that they
fully consider the operation of missile defense systems in the vicinity of friendly
airbases. Specifically the policies should consider mandating the use of
coordination measures, such as safe-passage corridors and weapon control
volumes. All systems operating in the theater should be capable of displaying and
honoring these measures.
e Policies regarding the restriction of ARM classification measures should be
investigated. The difficulty with these policies is ensuring that the classification
criteria are broad enough to detect a wide variety of ARM characteristics while
ensuring that false positives are not produced.
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Safety Requirements and Constraints Violated
* Friendly air and ground activities were not coordinated
Failures and Inadequate Controls
- Policies for IFF checkout were not complete.
- Policies for interactions between air and ground forces operating in close
proximity were inadequate.
- Policies surrounding ARM classification were not restrictive enough to prevent
misclassifications
Process Model Flaws
e Believed that ground based IFF system checkout was adequate to ensure
proper IFF operation.
Figure 10 - Combined Operational Headquarters Level Analysis
Step 7 - Examination of Overall Communication and Coordination
As shown in the analysis of each level of the hierarchical safety control structure,
communication problems existed throughout the system. Rather than continuing to focus
on each component in the control structure individually, this section will examine the
communication and coordination problems that existed between components. These
problems fall into three primary categories: IFF system coordination, Airspace
coordination, and Air picture communication.
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Perhaps the most crucial communication breakdown occurred with the IFF system in
place in the theater. IFF checkout policies were not stringently enforced, IFF codes were
not always properly loaded at each platform, and IFF system status was not always
directly observable by the operators of the systems being employed. By its nature, IFF is
a system that relies on the communication of a set of codes used to identify friendly
aircraft. When this communication system breaks down, aircraft operators are no longer
protected from friendly fire.
Next, there was a distinct lack of airspace coordination between the various components
of the safety control structure. Even with the existence of liaison units between the Air
Operations and Land Operations command, it seemed that neither command was fully
aware of the activities of the other. This lack of coordination directly contributed to the
accident involving ZG710, placing the aircraft within range of the Patriot battery during a
crucial phase of flight. Even if liaison units had not existed between the two commands,
the Combined Operational Headquarters was in a position to coordinate, or ensure
coordination of, any activities in the airspace.
Finally, the Patriot battery did not possess a complete air picture because of a lack of
communication with the Patriot Battalion. As discussed earlier, this communications hole
existed because the battery's communication suite was still in transit from the US. The
result was that the battery did not possess a means to verify the identity of ZG710 and
was forced to rely only on what was directly observable by the battery. A more complete
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air picture could have helped the battery crew to realize that ZG7 10 was not an ARM, but
instead was a friendly aircraft.
Step 8 - Dynamics and Migration to a High Risk State
Over time, all systems naturally migrate toward a state of higher risk. This can be caused
by system degradation (e.g. component wear or failures), changes in the operating
environment, or changes in the organizational structure surrounding the system. In the
accident involving ZG710 the two most prominent areas of system migration were
changes in the IFF system state and changes to the communication channels.
The most obvious change in the IFF system was the presumed failure of ZG71O's
onboard IFF system. The inability of ZG710 to respond to IFF interrogations prevented it
from more easily being identified as a friendly aircraft. These IFF responses were critical
to the prevention of friendly fire. But it was not only the IFF failure at ZG710 that
migrated the system toward a higher risk state. It was also confirmed that the Patriot
battery did not have Mode 1 IFF codes loaded at the time of the accident. The design of
the IFF system allows for multiple modes to be interrogated simultaneously. In some
cases the responses can lead to ambiguous results (e.g. a positive Mode 1 response and a
negative Mode IV response), but in some cases the multiple responses allow for an
element of redundancy. By not having one of these modes available, the chances of
misidentification were increased.
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The other area of risk migration involved the communication channel between the Patriot
battery and the Patriot Battalion HQ. Typically when a Patriot battery is emplaced in the
field it is commanded by the battalion HQ and voice and data links are established
between the units. These links allow for the transmission of operational control data such
as IFF codes and ARM classification criteria. However at the time of the accident, the
Patriot battery was allowed to operate without this data link. This was not an oversight
during the setup process, but a conscious decision made when the shipment of the
battery's communication equipment was delayed. In order to allow the battery to perform
its air defense mission and protect the troops stationed nearby, it was decided that the
battery could operate autonomously even though it would have a reduced air picture.
Both of these areas of migration helped to contribute to the accident involving ZG710.
Step 9 - Recommendations
In summary this CAST analysis of the friendly fire accident involving ZG710
recommends that the following actions be taken to address inadequacies in the safety
control structure:
e As stated in the MOD report [5], the IFF system in the Tornado aircraft should be
modified to alert the crew to a failure in all fault modes, including power supply
failures.
- All IFF modes should be checked prior to takeoff. Any codes loaded into the
aircraft should be checked by an independent source and should not rely on the
same information source that was used to load the codes into the aircraft. By
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verifying the IFF codes independently, it can be assured that the proper code sets
were distributed to all units in the same theater.
- In addition to the pre-takeoff checks, a positive IFF challenge and response
should be initiated at appropriate control points during the aircraft's flight (e.g.
handoff to a new control authority). The aircraft crew must be notified if a
response is not received or is incorrect.
- Along these lines, an investigation should be performed to identify why the lack
of IFF responses from ZG710 was not reported by any unit during the mission.
The MOD report states that there is no indication that a response was ever
received from ZG710, but does not indicate why this was not reported before
ZG710 attempted to land.
e Operational protocols should be modified to ensure that the published speed and
altitude restrictions take into account any missile defense units within range of the
operating environment.
- Operational protocols should be reviewed with regards to allowing a missile
defense unit to operate in autonomous mode. The lack of any external
identification information increases the risk to friendly aircraft in the area.
Specific operating criteria and procedures, such as the proper functioning of all
IFF modes, should be put in place to reduce the impact of operating in this
degraded state.
- The procedures related to the restriction of ARM classification criteria should be
modified to ensure that missile defense systems are operating with a set of criteria
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that reflects the types of threats that are expected in the operating theater. Care
should be taken to ensure that the criteria are neither too broad nor too narrow.
The operational protocol should also discuss the transmission of these criteria via
alternate methods if the primary communication method (in this case the Patriot
data link) is not available.
- Patriot battery crewmembers must be trained to identify target classifications
independent of the automated classification performed by the system. In the event
of a misclassification, the operators should be able to identify the error and
override the system classification.
- Communications between land and air operation commands should be improved
regarding the coordination of airspace operations. Specifically, airspace control
measures, such as safe-passage corridors, should be used to provide a measure of
safety when operating in the vicinity of missile defense systems. Additionally,
IFF procedures and codes must be coordinated to ensure that this important
system is operated to its full potential.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
This thesis analyzed the friendly-fire incident that occurred on 22 March 03 between a
British Tornado aircraft and a Patriot missile battery using a system-based accident
causality model. This analysis examined all levels of the hierarchical safety control
structure in order to find flaws and inadequacies in the control actions provided at each
level of the hierarchy. By examining the interactions between each component of the
control structure a deeper understanding of each entities action's was developed. Further,
the analysis uncovered the rationale behind many of the decisions that were made leading
up to the incident.
It is the author's hope that some of the recommendations provided in this thesis can be
used to help ensure the safety of aircraft operating in the vicinity of ground-based missile
defense systems. Protecting friendly aircraft is not an easy task, but implementing some
of the recommendations of this analysis may help to make such operations safer for those
involved. Additionally, it is hoped that future accident investigations or pre-deployment
safety analyses may use system-based causation models, like STAMP, in order to more
fully understand the interactions of complex socio-technical systems.
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